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Microfinance is often hailed both as a tool for fighting poverty and as a
tool for post-conflict reconciliation. This paper explores the use of mi-
crofinance in post-civil war Bosnia and Herzegovina, assessing its re-
sults in terms of both goals. As it combined high unemployment with
a highly educated population in an institutionally open context, Bosnia
and Herzegovina provides a crucial test of the eﬀect of microfinance. If
unambiguous signs of success cannot be found in a case with such fa-
vorable conditions, this would raise serious questions about the poten-
tial benefits of microfinance. The paper draws together evidence from
a series of independent reviews of microfinance in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, to assess its impact in terms of economic performance, the
economic system, social welfare and post-conflict integration. Based
on this case study, microfinance appears a better tool for dealing with
poverty than with social integration or institution building.
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Introduction
Microfinance is often hailed both as a tool for fighting poverty and as a
tool for post-conflict reconciliation. Since the 2000s microfinance has in-
creasingly been employed as a means for poverty-reduction. Its interna-
tional profile as a tool for poverty alleviation was secured in 2006, when
Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank were awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize. Yet, since the 1970s, microfinance has also been seen as part of a
post-conflict reconstruction strategy. It is in recent years that the strat-
egy has been more frequently used (Nagarajan and McNulty 2004). In
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Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter bh), both approaches of microfi-
nance were used after the 1992–1995 war left the country in ruin.
The bh microfinance sector developed rapidly, transforming microfi-
nance institutions (mfis) from donor-funded institutions into financi-
ally-sustainable microcredit organizations (mcos). The sector gradu-
ally became institutionalized. Many commentators have therefore pro-
claimed a case of the bh microfinance sector as successful. However,
there are also voices raised against such evaluation, due to the country’s
stagnation in developing the small and medium enterprise (sme) sector
(Bateman various years).
Microfinance is extensively used as a development tool, and is largely
supported by existing financial, technical and political resources. How-
ever, less is known about microfinance in post-conflict situations. For
instance, Woodworth (2006) argues that more research is needed on the
complexities of managing mfis in times of conflict and post-conflict,
while Nagarajan and McNulty (2004) find that implementing eﬀective
microfinance in specific post-conflict contexts is not yet well understood.
These and similar studies suggest that while post-conflict microfi-
nance strategies may indeed resemble normal strategies, there are also
important diﬀerences – for example the trust-building aspect of micro-
finance emphasized by Doyle (1998). However, we can go even further
in exploring the relationship between microfinance and conflict. For ex-
ample, we can explore the relationship between the social environment
and microfinance in order to discover what impact microfinance has on
the post-conflict environments. Such an inquiry would be in line with
the general approach applied in the microfinance research field, which
is mainly preoccupied with scrutinizing the social and financial impact
of microfinance. In the present study, evaluation of the financial impact
is carried out in terms of: (i) the immediate eﬀect on profit, business
start-ups and economic performance, as well as (ii) the eﬀect on the de-
velopment of the broader economic system including institutions and
the rule of law. In terms of its social impact, the focus is on (iii) the wel-
fare and social equality of the users of microfinance, as well as (iv) on
post-conflict reconciliation and integration.
bh represents a key test case for this type of inquiry because it mirrors
a broader debate about the impact of microfinance – a divided opinion
among scholars and practitioners about the impact and contribution of
microfinance to the country’s overall development. Therefore, this re-
port has three main objectives: first, it will provide a brief overview of
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microfinance as a tool for poverty reduction and as used in post-conflict
situations, as well as a critique of microfinance. Second, it will outline
a case of the bh microfinance sector – its establishment, development,
current trends and impact. Third, it will identify what we can learn from
this case as well as oﬀer avenues of further research, focusing on issues of
evaluation.
Microfinance, Poverty and Post-Conflict Reconciliation
Microfinance (mf) is a development tool designed to address issues of
poverty, under-development and marginalization. It is based on a sim-
ple idea: to provide poor individuals with access to microloans. These
microloans allow a client to start a micro-business. In the best-case sce-
nario, such micro-businesses develop into a small-medium enterprise.
Such mfis are often supported by government or international donor
funding. Over time, these institutions aim at commercializing their op-
erations and achieving their own financial self-sustainability. As a devel-
opment tool, microfinance has been used both to reduce the poverty and
to support countries recovering from a conflict or a major disaster.
mf is seen as an important factor in reaching the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (Littlefield, Murduch and Hashemi 2003). Donor fund-
ing provided to mfis usually includes poverty reduction in their mis-
sion. Based on a review of impact studies that took place in the period
1994–2002, Littlefield et al. (2003) find that microfinance goes beyond
just business loans – it aﬀects investments in health and education, man-
agement of household requirements, and other cash needs.
For example, since 1989 ‘Freedom from Hunger’ has worked with lo-
cal partners to develop and distribute a cost-eﬀective strategy to improve
the nutritional status and food security of poor households in rural areas
of Africa, Latin America and Asia. MkNelly and Dunford conducted an
impact evaluation study of these programs in Ghana in 1998 and Bolivia
(crecer – Credit with Education Program) in 1999. In Ghana, clients’
economic, social and health status were shown to improve due to micro-
finance (MkNelly and Dunford 1998). In Bolivia, MkNelly and Dunford
(1999) documented that microfinance led to improved nutritional and
health status of the clients’ families, as well as higher involvement in lo-
cal government.
These studies point to what Boudreaux and Cowen (2008) named ‘the
micromagic of microcredit.’ Boudreaux and Cowen (2008, 31) explain:
‘Withmicrocredit, life becomesmore bearable and easier to manage. The
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improvements may not show up as an explicit return on investment, but
the benefits are very real.’ According to Boudreaux and Cowen (2008),
microcredit is an alternative to money lending, which is a traditional
way of borrowing and lending money to the poor part of the popula-
tion. As such, microcredit is a more humane way of providing access
to credit for the poor. They compare the microcredit and moneylender
approaches and suggest some advantages for the microcredit approach,
such as easing debt burdens as well as formalizing and institutionalizing
the business relationships. Compared to the traditional banks, on the
other hand, the microcredit institutions lend to people who work also
in the informal sector (Boudreaux and Cowen 2008). In short, microfi-
nance initiatives reduce poverty, promote education of children, improve
health and empower women.
However, because poverty and war are sometimes linked, microfi-
nance is often used in post-conflict contexts. Conflicts cause degradation
of both quality of life and the economic situation. They lead to dysfunc-
tional states; in some cases, states practically even cease to exist. Many
post-conflict environments suﬀer from a lack of financial and social cap-
ital, infrastructure and functioning relationships (Nagarajan 1999). Busi-
ness activities are adversely aﬀected by such instable macro-economic
frameworks. Humanitarian aid projects are suitable for the immediate
post-conflict period, helping the population overcome starvation and
diseases. Microfinance can be a means for managing the transition from
humanitarian relief to economic reconstruction and sustainable devel-
opment (Seibel 2006; Hudon and Seibel 2007). It can be an integral part
in ‘jump-starting’ a crippled economy, aiming to rebuild and recover lo-
cal economies (Nagarajan 1999). It can also foster legitimate business ac-
tivities by facilitating linkages between refugee and local markets, as well
as undermining informal lending.
However, microfinance may also have a broader impact in terms of
peace and reconciliation. For example Nagarajan (1999) emphasizes the
possibility of mfis playing a role in the restoration of social capital when
they provide long-term viable services. Doyle (1998) shows how mi-
crofinance initiatives in Rwanda helped local Hutu and Tutsi popula-
tions to overcome their diﬀerences following the civil war in the 1990s,
and to find common ground in business development through microfi-
nance. Generalizing about such eﬀects may still be premature, but there
are signs that microfinance might help restore and build social capital
through creating a meeting point and facilitating business relations.
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Themain criticism ofmicrofinance is that it may have an adverse eﬀect
on broader development. This applies particularly to post-communist
states, because the legacy of the communist (the ‘second world’) may
be very diﬀerent from conditions in developing countries (the ‘third
world’). A 2007 issue of the Development and Transition¹ addressed the
current state of the private sector in post-communist Eastern Europe and
asked how development agencies can strengthen their work in five areas,
one of which was microfinance. A central argument focused on the inad-
equate attention paid to the local and global conditions and post-socialist
legacies when designing ‘blanket’ reforms such as generic sme support,
commercializing the microfinance sector and liberalizing the business
environments (Hughes and Slay 2007).
A stronger critique asks whether microfinance can actually undermine
medium-term economic development because it supports ineﬃcient ac-
tivities. This relates specifically to commercial microfinance. Bateman
(2007a) criticized ‘new wave commercial microfinance’ institutions that
avoid international and government financial support and supervision,
while extending microcredit to many poor individuals and communi-
ties. These commercial mfis tend to support microenterprises that op-
erate well below the minimum eﬃcient scale and have little realistic
chance of long-run survival. This, Bateman argues, has two negative con-
sequences: first, a high rate of microenterprise exit caused by the satura-
tion phenomenon within the informal sector; and second, high oppor-
tunity costs for the countries, since a standard commercial microfinance
business model does not make it possible for microenterprise to deploy
advanced technologies, skills and product and process innovations. Bate-
man found that there is little solid evidence to confirm that commercial
microfinance facilitates sustainable economic and social development.
Reviewing the data from Central and Eastern Europe, Galusek (2007)
found that mfis in the region had served over 4 million clients (pre-
dominantly low-income families and microenterprises) by the end of
2005, but that although there was rapid growth in microfinance in the
region, there was no evidence that mfis are successful in reaching the
low-income groups on a large scale (Galusek 2007). He emphasized that a
commercialized approach of mfis is a consequence of the donor commu-
nity that encouraged such amodel, and called for microfinance strategies
and products to respond to the needs of the region.
In a recent paper Roodman and Morduch (2009) argue that many of
the oft-cited positive impacts of microfinance originate in two studies
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from Bangladesh, Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Khandker (2005), and
are in fact based on faulty statistical methods. After replicating the anal-
yses of the same datasets, with slightly diﬀerent statistical techniques,
Roodman and Morduch found that ‘reverse or omitted-variable causa-
tion is driving the results, and that the endogenous credit-consumption
relationship varies substantially by subsample, as well as borrower sex,
which can explain the seeming gender diﬀerential in impact’ (Roodman
and Morduch 2009, 3). Their paper argues that, with few exceptions,
the idea that microfinance eﬀectively reduces poverty, that poverty-
reduction is especially eﬀective when the borrowers are female, and that
the poorer the recipient the greater the benefit, are results of incorrectly
applied statistical analyses rather than evidence of the true eﬀect of mi-
crofinance.
A broader debate concerns the issue of whether microfinance fits a
country’s strategy for economic growth. Calling for ‘jobs, not microcre-
dit,’ Karnani (2007a) reviewed macroeconomic data and found that al-
though microcredit yields some non-economic benefits, it does not sig-
nificantly eradicate poverty. Even thoughmicrofinance canmake life bet-
ter at the ‘bottom of the pyramid,’ creating jobs and increasing worker
productivity is a better way to get rid of poverty. Unless microfinance
directly aﬀects the jobless, it is merely a way of transforming employ-
ees into micro-entrepreneurs – simply by replacing old businesses with
microcredit-funded micro-businesses. Such crowding-out results nei-
ther in net job nor in income gains (Storey 1994). Therefore, Karnani
(2007b) suggested that romanticizing the poor as ‘resilient and creative
entrepreneurs’ harms the same poor individuals in two ways: it under-
emphasizes modern enterprises as well as legal, regulatory and social
mechanisms to protect the poor; and it overemphasizes the impact of mi-
crocredit. Therefore, Karnani (2007a) suggested that governments, busi-
nesses and civil society should work together to reallocate their resources
away from microfinance and instead support larger enterprises in labor-
intensive industries. This formula, he claims, worked well in China, Ko-
rea, and Taiwan.
Even though the microfinance concept has been present for more than
thirty years, the evidence on its eﬀects is at bestmixed. It is still diﬃcult to
identify any sustainable development trajectories arising from this expe-
rience. Countries such as India, China, Thailand, Vietnam,Malaysia, Tai-
wan, Brazil and South Korea, have been successfully dealing with under-
development by employing a variety of state and non-state interventions
as well as institutional innovations not related to microfinance. China,
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Vietnam and South Korea have significantly reduced poverty in recent
years with little microfinance activity. Bangladesh, Bolivia and Indone-
sia have not been as successful at reducing poverty despite the influx
of microcredit (Karnani 2007a). Somewhere in between these extremes
lie the countries of Eastern Europe, which started channeling of donor
funds into microfinance in the 1990s as a response to a number of pro-
cesses, ranging from the conflict and post-conflict era to deindustria-
lization.
Microfinance in Bosnia andHerzegovina
Using Bosnia and Herzegovina as a case study allows for testing microfi-
nance both as a tool for post conflict mitigation and as a means for eco-
nomic development and poverty reduction in a post-communist econ-
omy. bh represents what can be labeled a best-case scenario for testing
the impact of microfinance initiatives.
First, bh still had a highly educated work force when the conflict
ended – what Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2007) called an ‘entrepreneurial
middle class.’ However, war activities resulted in a per capita gdp drop
of 75 percent (from 2,400 usd to 600 usd) registered over a five-year pe-
riod, from 1990 to 1995 (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2007). Consequently, three
out of four could not aﬀord basic family necessities.
Second, most commonly identified favorable conditions were present.
The state-owned enterprises (soes) had been broken up during the war
– leaving highly educated people unemployed and displaced. There was
also a lack of capital for business start-ups (sdn 2001). Consequently
there was an opportunity for microfinance to provide sought-after capi-
tal to suitable borrowers. There may be parallels here to the importance
of trust (social capital) and aﬀordable credit (loans to small enterprise)
in post-conflict reconstruction in other European states, such as Italy af-
ter the Second World War (Weiss 1988; Putnam 1993).
Third, weak political and economic institutions meant that mfis could
be set up with relative ease. In the formative years of the microfinance
institutions the regulatory framework was very limited, which allowed
the mfis significant leeway to establish their lending policies.
These factors meant that the ‘new poor’ in post-conflict bh repre-
sented a diﬀerent clientele than the poor in Africa and Asia, since they
were educated and usually possessed some physical assets. Hartarska and
Nadolnyak (2007, 4) oﬀer their description of the new poor:
The potential microentrepreneurs were people who before the war
might have had sophisticated private businesses but were displaced
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or, alternatively, people who, before the war, were factory workers
but became unemployed after the industry collapsed (post-war un-
employment reached as much as 85%).
Painting a less optimistic picture, Ohanyan (2002, 398) has underlined
the complexity of bh’s post-socialist, post-conflict context in the follow-
ing way:
The post-Communist conflict cases are characterized by the prob-
lem of multiple transitions, which refer to the variety of policy goals
that international organizations working in the country bring to the
table. Specifically, transitions (1) from war to peacetime economy,
(2) from command to market economy, and (3) from humanitarian
assistance to long-term development assistance are the major policy
goals driving the international involvement in bh.
Although it warrants some focus on possible favorable conditions, it is
argued that microfinance in a post-conflict environment is not dramat-
ically diﬀerent from other, ‘normal’ environments (Larson 2001). The
core idea still is to provide small amounts of credit to those deemed not
creditworthy in a traditional, commercial banking setting. A core con-
dition is that there must be a low intensity of conflict. This is amongst
other things necessary in order to ensure the safety and working condi-
tions of the mfi staﬀ, their oﬃces as well as the clients. This is the first
of three essential conditions set out by Doyle (1998). Doyle’s second con-
dition is that markets be reopened. In order for an mf initiative to be
successful there must be a certain resumption of economic activity, so
that the local population can believe in the changes at hand. The third
condition concerns long-term displacement, which is needed in order to
ensure some reiteration of relations. Doyle finds that displacement of at
least 18 months is reasonable for creating a possibility for the economic
investments to yield returns. This is especially important if the main ob-
jective of mf is to initiate economic growth, not to serve humanitarian
goals in the wake of disaster. Adopting a long-term view also makes the
mf seemmore stable, rather than a quick, one-oﬀ fix (Woodworth 2006).
All three conditions were present in bh.
Doyle also lists a range of other helpful conditions, including the exis-
tence of a functioning commercial banking system; an absence of hyper-
inflation, which secures a predictable value of money over time; and a
certain density of population that increases the possibility for economic
linkages. Enabling legislation for mfis is also preferred in order to make
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the future more predictable for the microfinance lenders. It is also prefer-
able for the providers of mf to have access to locally skilled and educated
labor to staﬀ the organization, while more social capital is preferable to
less, due to its eﬀect on demand, scale, training needs and operational
eﬃciency. Finally, trust in the local currency and financial institutions is
preferred. mfis should also be cautious about their client target when of-
fering credit in a post-conflict setting (Woodworth 2006). They should
not oﬀer credit to everyone as a peace-building measure, but keep in
mind the probability for repayment and economic development.
bh is sometimes hailed as an excellent example of success of a micro-
credit enterprise in post-conflict situations, considering its financially
sustainable microfinance institutions (Woodworth 2006). The mfis ini-
tiated their activities shortly after the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement
ended the war, and over the ten following years 50 mfis were estab-
lished (Ribic 2005). The increase in the number of mfis in bh followed
a general trend of increased funding for microfinance activities. This
happened in an environment in which financial sectors oﬃcials accepted
ngos giving loans and government oﬃcials made the registration pro-
cess for ngos quick and simple (Woodworth 2006). Today, the bh mfis
are some of the largest in Eastern Europe, financially self-sustainable and
operating in a competitive environment.
Both short- and medium-term microfinance strategies have been ap-
plied in bh (Ohanyan 2002). While the first approach sees microfinance
as an immediate peace-building instrument targeting segments of the
population and oﬀering financial services to these specific clients, the
second approach is more commercially focused on the long-term sus-
tainability of the microfinance institutions. The first approach tends to
be favored by humanitarian organizations – such as the unhcr – in or-
der to reintegrate minorities, oﬀer a social safety net and minimize the
social cost of transition (Ohanyan 2002; Hudon and Seibel 2007). The
second approach was favored by some of the international donors fund-
ing the mfis, such as the World Bank. Overall there seems to be a con-
sensus that the environment for growth in microfinance in bh was good.
Financial oﬃcials accepted that ngos were providing the credit, and gov-
ernment oﬃcials facilitated the registration process.
The brief history of microfinance in bh can be divided into two peri-
ods, before and after 2000. The initial period, from 1996 to 2000, covered
the early years of microcredit during which legislation was nearly non-
existent. This coincided with the first of two World Bank-financed mi-
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crofinance institutions in bh: Local Initiatives Project i and ii, covering
the time periods 1996–2000 and 2002–2005, respectively.
The World Bank was joined by the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (unhcr), the Netherlands, Italy, Japan, Switzerland
and Austria in financing the lip i project, which had the following three
objectives (World Bank 2001):
• lip i should respond to urgent needs by targeting demobilized sol-
diers, displaced persons, returning refugees and widows.
• It should commence a process of establishing financially sustainable
mfis in 5–10 years time.
• Further it should improve the business and regulatory environ-
ments for self-employment, micro- and small-enterprises, as well
as the regulatory environment for non-financial mfis.
In the World Bank report (2004), lip i was qualified as a successful
project and had produced results beyond original expectations: Through
micro-credit organizations (mco) established under the project, some
20,000 micro-enterprises with up to five employees had received 50,261
loans with maturity ranging between 6 and 18 months. The loaned sums
were small, averaging 1,600 usd. Repayment records were very good,
likely helped by the incentive of receiving larger loans if repaid on time.
50 percent of recipients were females (war widows), 21 percent were dis-
placed persons, while 5 percent were returning refugees. 17 ngos were
funded in order to initiate microcredit activities in 1996, and by the end
of 2000, eight of nine mfis funded under lip i became self-sustainable.
On the basis of these results the second phase of the project was launched
in 2001.
The second period is the post-2000 era, when a more advanced legal
framework was elaborated. The first two years, 2000–2001, saw the adop-
tion of the microcredit organization (mco) laws that were put in place to
cope with the institutions that had developed in the immediate postwar
period. It was not an easy political environment in which to operate, and
the adopted legislative agenda was limited. Cicic and Sunje (2002) ana-
lyzed the proposed regulation, and found that it proved diﬃcult to have
mfis assume the form of a finance company – a privately owned lending
institution not necessarily limited to microenterprise lending. Neither
was it possible to regulate them as savings and credit associations that
would allow them to mobilize capital from their members in the form of
savings, nor as microfinance institutions that would be authorized to ac-
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cept deposits from the general public (Cicic and Sunje 2002). Rather, the
legislation allowed the mfis to be regulated as microcredit organizations
that were non-profit, credit only-institutions. The mco-law was passed
in bh parliament in 2000 and rs parliament in 2001, allowing mcos to
operate in both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Re-
publika Srpska (Lyman 2005). The World Bank was an important driver
in furthering this legislative agenda. In 2002–2003 the broader legislative
developments concerning the financial system took place. The Central
Bank is the main monetary authority of bh, while the Banking Agencies
conduct supervision and enforcement of banking regulations (de Mon-
toya et al. 2006). Since 2004 the microcredit sector has been maturing,
and the Central Bank has emerged as the likely dominant force in the
future development of the bh financial system (Lyman 2005).
During this period, the World Bank’s second Local Initiatives Project
(lip ii) focused on facilitating the transformations of mcos from ngos
to commercial-legal organizations. This furthered financial market leg-
islation and regulation, as well as mco market consolidation (Lyman
2005). These developments gave the mcos the opportunity to operate as
mfis – oﬀering both credit and deposit, as well as making it possible for
them to transform into for-profit institutions. The lip ii came into ef-
fect in the spring of 2002, with a budget of some 24 million usd of which
the World Bank/International Development Agency financed 20 million
usd and the two Entity governments the remainder (Dunn 2005). The
project’s aim was to raise incomes, develop businesses and increase em-
ployment through the use of microfinance institutions. This was to be
done in two specific ways (World Bank 2005):
• lip ii should finance the growth and institutional development
of high-performing microfinance institutions with the potential to
provide sustainable financial services to the ‘unbankable.’
• It should also support the transition of the microfinance sector to-
wards sustainable sources of financing.
The World Bank found the lip ii to produce satisfactory outcomes,
as the project had significantly influenced the entrepreneurial poor,
strengthened the mcos’ capacity for providing high-quality credit ser-
vices to their clients, and had helped ‘create and/or sustain more than
200,000 jobs in nearly 100,000 micro-businesses’ (World Bank 2005, 4).
Consequently, lip i and ii have had major influences on the develop-
ment of a microfinance sector in bh (Dunn 2005). The lips were seen
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as necessary for providing micro entrepreneurs with access to loans.
With the transition from the first to second phase, microfinance in-
stitutions in bh gradually acquired more autonomy and financial in-
dependence. Initially, the Ministry of Finance wanted direct control of
the microcredit project, while the World Bank preferred the mfis to
be autonomous entities. The two compromised by using the existing
Employment and Training Foundations to create the Local Initiative De-
partments (lids) in both the Federation and Republika Srpska. After
this proved successful they agreed to channel all the funds through the
lids (sdn 2001). Most mfis became financially self-suﬃcient shortly
after their establishment. Under the lip i Project, eight mfis became
self-sustainable and five were fully financially sustainable – perhaps most
notably among them the Pro-Credit Bank (Cicic and Sunje 2002). Five
mfis thus had a positive fully adjusted return on assets, and hence suﬃ-
cient income to cover all costs including inflation, market costs of funds
and adjustments of subsidies. mfis tripled their total assets and gross
loan portfolio in the 1999–2003 period (Berryman and Pytkowska 2003).
Long-term sustainability can be challenged when the mfis operate in
limited markets, have similar groups of beneficiaries, oﬀer similar prod-
uct portfolios, and share similar missions. In bh, however competition
both inside the mfi-sector and from the commercially oriented banking
sector prevented this outcome, and prompted major consolidation of
microfinance institutions (Berryman and Pytkowska 2003). Therefore,
the lip ii could reduce the number of organizations that received funds
to 8, a significant downscaling from the 17 receiving funds through lip i
(Dunn 2005). Since the introduction of new mco legislation in 2006, the
organizations can be transformed into non-profit microcredit founda-
tions (mcf) or for-profit microcredit companies (mccs) (Mehmedovic
and Sapundzhieva 2009). This legislation opens the capital structure of
the mfis/mccs to investors – securing further access to finance.
The Impact of Microfinance in Bosnia
Several independent studies have assessed the impact of microfinance
activities in bh. The results vary from positive, through neutral, to neg-
ative. It is likely that the varying assessments have to do with issues of
methodology. For example, as found by Matul and Tsilikounas (2004),
the impact on entrepreneurs’ finances has been underemphasized in bh,
as the social impact was the main interest in the post-war environment.
The following section provides an overview and assessment of this range
Managing Global Transitions
Assessing Microfinance 157
of studies and reports. These findings are organized under four labels:
(i) the immediate eﬀect on profit, business start ups and economic per-
formance, as well as (ii) the eﬀect on the development of the broader
economic system including institutions and the rule of law. In terms of
its social impact, the focus is on (iii) the welfare and social equality of the
users of microfinance, as well as (iv) on post-conflict reconciliation and
integration.
First, assessments of the success of mfis and their eﬀect on growth
have generally been positive. Although it is inadequate to assess the suc-
cess of the microfinance initiative by assessing the sustainability of the
mfis themselves, because profitability is not necessarily correlated with
the sustainability of the businesses to which they lend, this is a first step.
Because the mfis in bh competed for clients, they quickly learned the
use of methods like focus groups, exit interviews and market research
in order to better learn clients’ needs and how to meet them with im-
proved financial services (Hartarska and Nadolnyak 2007). This market-
solution, in turn, led to a growth in products oﬀered, and as a result,
the range of mfis was better able to meet the needs of a diverse group
of entrepreneurs (Goranja 1999). Thus, mfi profitability can be seen as a
measure of selling successful products to the client population.
The World Bank’s own evaluation (2004) of lip i found that the
project had made an important contribution to the resumption of eco-
nomic activity in the post-war bh, through supporting start-ups and
the expansion of small businesses (World Bank 2004). Specific data on
business start-ups were not collected in the baseline survey, however. In
the evaluation of lip ii, the World Bank (2005) found that microcredit
services had helped create and/or sustain more than 200,000 jobs and
served 98,852 active clients. However, the lip ii, and consequently the
self-evaluation, focused mainly on the development of the sector rather
than its broader impact on the economy and society. The sustainabil-
ity of these micro-businesses is also drawn into doubt as World Bank
researchers have found that just under half of new microenterprises es-
tablished in bh between the 2002 and 2003 failed within just one year
(Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2007). It is also noteworthy that the project’s ac-
complishments on documenting its impact on a client-level were rated
not higher than satisfactory.
There have also been independent assessments of the lips, as well as of
the bh microfinance initiative as a whole. In a study of 1,437 microcredit
clients and rejected clients,² Cicic and Sunje (2002) found that microcre-
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dit is positively correlated with new business-generation, the addition of
new lines to existing businesses, a growth in production, and, less regu-
larly, employment. By using data collected from the World Bank’s Living
Standards Measurement Survey, Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) evalu-
ated the impact of the bh microfinance industry as a whole. Their find-
ings showed that mfis improved access to credit in municipalities where
two or more mfis oﬀered competing financial products.
The main critique has centered on the broader impact of microfi-
nance on the bh economy. Bateman (2007b) argues that the commer-
cial microfinance approach has led to deindustrialization and infantiliza-
tion of the bh economy. It has atomized the local enterprise sector,
programmed to reach only the minimum eﬃcient scale of operations,
while simultaneously facilitating trade deficits and destruction of lo-
cal social capital. He argues that there was never an attempt to estab-
lish a local industrial policy for bh, although ‘the comparatively high
level of industrial development, skills and technology in 1995 represented
a once only opportunity to establish a core of small-scale, innovative,
relatively technology-intensive, industry-related ventures’ (2007b, 214).
These high opportunity costs are due to the commercial microfinance
model, which represented ‘the only major local financial support struc-
ture in bh’ and was used for funding of ‘largely unsustainable trade-
and household-based economic activities.’ Bateman has identified an ad-
verse selection of the microfinance clients, and an anti-industrial bias
characterized by ‘[f]iltering out those potential entrepreneurs wishing to
work in the industrial sector but who cannot hope to service the oner-
ous terms and conditions oﬀered by the commercial microfinance in-
stitutions, and filtering in those ventures incorporating only the very
simplest of non-industrial business ideas that just about can’ (Bateman
2007b, 214). Rather than providing credit to microenterprises, it has been
argued that credit should be oﬀered on aﬀordable terms and maturi-
ties to small businesses, drawing on the experiences from the military-
industrial complex in Northern Italy, amongst other places, that was cen-
tral in rebuilding, restructuring and developing the post-Second World
War economy (Weiss 1988).
Bateman (2007a) argues that microfinance has been mostly directed
towards the informal sector. That way, he argues, it does not create
businesses but rather subsidizes microenterprises and that it has a re-
distributive eﬀect. Microfinance has ‘undermined most local economic
and social development triggers, such as cumulative and coordinated
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investments, capturing economics of scale and scope, technological in-
novation, inculcating social capital, or incorporating technical skills and
knowledge’ (Bateman 2007a, 4). Bateman (2007a) has tried to nuance
the impression of microfinance in bh by pointing out that 30 per cent of
borrowers from mfis during the lip i-period that were surveyed in 2002
had failed within two years.
Second, most studies point to a positive eﬀect of microfinance on bh’s
economic and legal system, although there are some broader criticisms
of its small-scale and liberal focus. Again, the World Bank’s own assess-
ment is the most positive. The transitions for mcos to increasingly rely
on themarket as a source of finance, as well as the mcos’ project manage-
ment, which were both rated highly satisfactory. Its impacts in furthering
legal and regulatory reform, providing institutional support for mcos,
and documenting microcredit impact were rated satisfactorily (World
Bank 2005). This indicates a highly professional microfinance sector that
has been granted due attention by the World Bank. In a study of the
mf experience in bh, Dunn (2005) analyzes data on the eﬀect of mf
for clients and non-clients alike. In her impact assessment of the lip
ii, Dunn found that microcredit indeed has positive impacts on house-
hold welfare, business development and business start-ups, employment,
workers’ wages, as well as livestock development, amongst other things.
However, isolating the impact of mf is diﬃcult. mf lending is not the
only source of finance for the micro-businesses. Dunn found that 29 per-
cent of entrepreneurs had loaned finances from alternative sources, in
addition to the mfis with which they were associated at the time. For ex-
ample, foreign-owned commercial banks, incentivized by the profitable
microcredit sector, did increase their supply of microloans to bh. Chen
and Chivakul (2008) attribute much of the real growth in credit to bh
households between 2001 and 2006 to the emergence of these banks on
the bh scene, standing at nearly 50 percent compared to the real growth
rate for credit to enterprises of 13.5 percent.
Critics of microfinance in bh point to the close association with neo-
liberalism, trade and privatization, and its adverse eﬀects on investment
and the overall economic system. Bateman and Chang (2009) criticize
the microfinance model on several accounts. For example, the focus on
mf ignores economies of scale by stimulating individual start-ups. This
leads to economic activity being organized in the least eﬃcient way, they
argue. Proponents of mf lending have also drawn attention away from
other perverse eﬀects. For example, Bosnian mfis provided financing for
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its clients to purchase cows, resulting in over-supply of milk and conse-
quently decreasing prices (Bateman and Chang 2009). The indirect eﬀect
of mf lending thus adversely aﬀected the one-cow farmers and incum-
bent milk producers alike. mf favors easy business ventures that are able
tomeet the short maturity of the loans, while capital-intensive businesses
are under-represented in terms of mf (Bateman and Chang 2009). The
lack of capital-intensive investments further leads to a trade deficit since
such goods must be imported.
Third, in terms of the overall eﬀect of micro-finance on welfare and
social equality, the verdict is even more mixed. But measurement is
also more problematic. It is not unusual for mfis to be designed for
reaching certain especially sought-after groups. However, as Meissner
(2005) points out, reaching only these groups may have the perverse ef-
fect of creating jealousy among other groups – thus undermining the
very restoration of social capital. Rather good programs should be avail-
able for everyone – including the conflict-aﬀected groups. In designing
products and strategies, the institutions oﬀering mf should take care not
to discriminate between potential clients, as mf can best help refugees
integrate into society by oﬀering them access to credit along the same
lines as non-refugees. Furthermore, mere mf outreach does not consti-
tute mf impact; while reaching the sought-after groups is a necessary
condition for impact, it is the actions undertaken with the borrowed
funds that result in real impact. Measuring and determining any causal
eﬀects is diﬃcult – perhaps especially so with regard to the social goals
of mf in post-conflict settings. Determining whether the rebuilding of
social capital can be credited as mf, or whether it is due to resumption of
‘normal’ social activity, is challenging to measure. As noted by Meissner
(2005), it might take years before the eﬀects of social capital construc-
tion initiatives emerge. Matul and Tsilikounas (2004) also point towards
methodological issues arising from an evident selection bias. They found
that, in most cases, the non-clients either did not know of the possibility
for receiving microcredit, or else were concerned that their ‘lack of en-
trepreneurial spirit, skills, or ability to plan’ would negatively aﬀect their
ability to repay the loans (Matul and Tsilikounas 2004, 8).
The World Bank’s self-evaluations of the lip projects concluded that
implementations were more or less successful. The World Bank’s (2004)
self-evaluation of lip i found that the project had successfully assisted
both the economically disadvantaged and other underserved groups in
resuming economic activities, as well as supporting the establishment of
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an institutional framework for micro-credit. The evaluation also found
bank performance and borrower performance to be highly satisfactory.
Dunn (2005) found that over the period 2002–2004, mfi clients’ annual
per capita income increased, while the change in non-clients’ income
was insignificant. Over the same period, the figures showed that only the
clients that had a relationship with the mfis for over more than two years
experienced a lower share of households below the national poverty level
– set at km 1100 per person. This eﬀect was not identified with the clients
that had a relationship extending for less than two years. Dunn’s data
indicate that ‘income trends were generally positive’ (2005, 23). But an
alternative reading is also possible, inasmuch as the positive income ef-
fect from mf does not extend beyond the client base. Furthermore, the
poverty-alleviating eﬀect is not well documented. The data are some-
what unclear on this point, and may indicate that time is of the essence
and that such eﬀects may take a few years to materialize. Critics such as
Bateman (2007b, 220) argue that:
Very little evidence has emerged in bh to suggest that the commer-
cial microfinance model actually possesses the required ‘transfor-
mative capacity’ to secure genuinely sustainable poverty reduction,
through genuinely sustainable local economic and social develop-
ment. On the contrary, the commercial microfinance model is quite
centrally implicated in the evolution of the disturbingly weak, un-
sophisticated, anti-social, disconnected and unfair economic and
social structures we see in bh today.
Fourth, and finally, the evidence that microfinance has contributed to
post-conflict reconstruction is limited, but positive. Conflicts and acts
of war traumatize the entire civilian population. After the conflict has
ended, the demobilized soldiers may experience issues related to partic-
ipating in conflicts, and in reconciling with former enemies. Generally
speaking, one can say that post-conflict societies tend to be characterized
also by low social capital. As trust is normally expected, at least partially,
to be built on iteration of relations (Hardin 2003), microfinance may
have a positive impact as it facilitates network development by providing
an arena for clients to meet. Goronja (1999) finds evidence that mf in bh
did indeed produce such reconciliatory eﬀects. Dunn’s 2005 study found
that microfinance did indeed reach the displaced persons – 36 percent
of beneficiaries and 34 percent of new beneficiaries were dislocated – the
demobilized, disabled and widowed.
Volume 8 · Number 2 · Summer 2010
162 Anne Welle-Strand, Kristian Kjøllesdal, and Nick Sitter
Conclusion
The overall picture is mixed. bh may be a good critical test case, but the
results are not unambiguous. It is clear that mf has had some positive
contributions in this post-conflict situation, and that mfi sustainability
in bh has been remarkable. However critics suggest that mf may actu-
ally have impeded sme development in the country, and that it remains
a challenge to make mf have an impact beyond the client base. The mfi-
model applied in bh has produced self-sustainable mf institutions with,
amongst other improvements, acceptable repayment rates. But equating
the success of mf institutions and their clients with the success of mf is
not enough. mf also aﬀects the broader legal and economic system, and
seems to have had a positive impact in the bh case. Even so, mf does not
necessarily translate into success in eﬀect among the population. This
point might be especially true in post-conflict situations where some of
the goals are of a social nature. There is therefore some concern that
a focus on mfi commercialization can be seen as a mission drift. For
a poverty alleviation and post-conflict strategy to be truly successful, it
cannot be limited to improving the standard of living for the mf clients
alone. Such a strategy would be significantly impacted by the issue of ad-
verse selection of mf clients. It can hardly be based on mf institutions’
assessment of the potentially most profitable clients. mf may indeed have
a positive eﬀect on both the economic and social arena, and working to
maintain and enhance these beyond the immediate post-conflict situa-
tion should still be a priority for mfis and governments alike. However,
the evidence reviewed in this article should indicate that mf is no silver
bullet, neither for securing economic growth nor for post-conflict rec-
onciliation. It should therefore be carefully evaluated in each setting how
mf is to be designed, and how it can best be complementary to other
programs for economic and social enhancement. Yet, as Christen and
Drake (2002, 16) point out, the ‘ultimate irony of microfinance is that
broad outreach is possible only if mfis are commercialized.’
The principal lessons of the short history of microfinance in Bosnia-
Herzegovina seem to be that microfinance is more impressive as a tool
to improve the economic performance of the mf institutions and their
clients than to reach broader social goals. It appears to be a better tool
for aiding its participants’ quest for wealth and escape from poverty on
an individual basis, than for addressing wider problems of social inte-
gration or institution building. The bh case provides an almost ideal test
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case, since it featured well-educated citizens with incentives to re-build
wealth after the destruction of war, and the evidence suggests that this
did indeed take place. Moreover, in a context where political and eco-
nomic institutions had been weakened by war, mf and mfo legislation
provided a building block toward rebuilding a small- and medium-scale
financial system. Broader social goals, from integration and reconcilia-
tion to inclusion, seem mainly to have been achieved (if at all) through
mf’s eﬀect on its individual participants. Perhaps the clearest conclusion
from the mf experience in bh is that even microfinance can only be used
to pursue one goal directly; the broader goals may be achieved indirectly,
if at all.
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